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Brian J. Grim4 
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Abstract 
BACKGROUND 
People who are religiously unaffiliated (including self-identifying atheists and 
agnostics, as well as those who say their religion is “nothing in particular”) made up 
16.4% of the world's population in 2010. Unaffiliated populations have been growing in 
North America and Europe, leading some to expect that this group will grow as a share 
of the world’s population. However, such forecasts overlook the impact of demographic 
factors, such as fertility and the large, aging unaffiliated population in Asia. 
 
OBJECTIVE 
We project the future size of religiously affiliated and unaffiliated populations around 
the world. 
 
METHODS 
We use multistate cohort-component methods to project the size of religiously affiliated 
and unaffiliated populations. Projection inputs such as religious composition, 
differential fertility, and age structure data, as well as religious switching patterns, are 
based on the best available census and survey data for each country. This research is 
based on an analysis of more than 2,500 data sources. 
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RESULTS 
Taking demographic factors into account, we project that the unaffiliated will make up 
13.2% of the world’s population in 2050. The median age of religiously affiliated 
women is six years younger than unaffiliated women. The 2010−15 Total Fertility Rate 
for those with a religious affiliation is 2.59 children per woman, nearly a full child 
higher than the rate for the unaffiliated (1.65 children per woman).  
 
CONCLUSION 
The religiously unaffiliated are projected to decline as a share of the world’s population 
in the decades ahead because their net growth through religious switching will be more 
than offset by higher childbearing among the younger affiliated population.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Social scientists have a long history of predicting the demise of religion. Auguste 
Comte, Emile Durkheim, Sigmund Freud, and Karl Marx envisioned the decline of 
organized religion and the rise of the religiously unaffiliated. More recently the idea 
that the unaffiliated population will increase has been promoted using mathematical 
models of social group competition (Abrams, Yaple et al. 2011) and assumptions that 
growing economic development will lead to evolution away from religion (Barber 
2012). But these predictions did not take demography into account − specifically, that 
patterns in global population growth favor those who have religious affiliation (Norris 
and Inglehart 2004; Kaufmann 2010). Our new demographic analysis finds that 
affiliated women have more children than unaffiliated women − nearly a full child more 
per woman, on average, worldwide. In addition, the global median age of affiliated 
women is six years younger than unaffiliated women, so they have more potential years 
of childbearing and living ahead. We project these demographic characteristics will 
result in a more religiously affiliated global population in coming decades. Although 
current patterns of religious switching favor the unaffiliated, they are insufficient at the 
global level to offset the demographic advantages of the affiliated.  
Demographic projections of affiliated and unaffiliated populations were not 
possible in the past because scholars had not collected the worldwide data necessary to 
make them. We assembled a database of religious composition and demographic 
characteristics, based on more than 2,500 censuses, surveys, and population registers 
for 198 countries and territories that make up 99.98% of the world’s population. Using 
this database, we made demographic projections of religiously affiliated and 
unaffiliated populations for the period from 2010 to 2050. Our global projections 
assume the continuation of recent switching patterns that strongly favor the unaffiliated, 
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particularly in North America, Europe, and Latin America, where we project the 
unaffiliated will grow as a share of those regions’ populations. But if current trends 
continue, the religiously unaffiliated will decline as a percentage of the world’s overall 
population, from 16.4% in 2010 to 13.2% in 2050. Even when we model a 50% 
increase in current rates of switching, tilting even more in favor of religious 
disaffiliation, the unaffiliated share of the world’s population would still be expected to 
decline, falling to 14.3% in 2050. 
 
 
2. Defining the religiously affiliated and unaffiliated  
The religiously unaffiliated include atheists, agnostics, and people who do not identify 
with any particular religion in surveys and censuses. We estimate that 1.1 billion people 
were religiously unaffiliated in 2010, including more than 700 million in China, home 
to 62% of the world’s religiously unaffiliated people. Some who state “no religion” in 
surveys do maintain a mix of religious beliefs and practices (Hout and Fischer 2002, 
Baker and Smith 2009). Nonetheless, based on the absence of self-identified religious 
affiliation, we classify them as unaffiliated (Hackett, Grim et al. 2012). 
The majority of the population in China, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hong Kong, 
Japan, and North Korea are religiously unaffiliated. The unaffiliated populations in 
these countries are considerably older than the rest of the world’s population. By 
contrast, in the United States, Australia, New Zealand and many European countries, 
unaffiliated minorities have been growing in recent years, with growth often 
concentrated among young adults.  
The religiously affiliated include, in order of 2010 population size, Christians, 
Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, people who practice folk or traditional religions, 
adherents of other religions, and Jews (Hackett, Grim et al. 2012). In this context, 
religious affiliation is measured by identification with one of these groups on a census 
or survey. It does not necessarily connote formal institutional membership. This 
measure of identity is distinct from religious commitment. Each group includes people 
with a range of religious beliefs and practices. Nonetheless, on average, the unaffiliated 
rank far below the affiliated on measures of religious commitment such as self-reported 
importance of religion, worship attendance, prayer, and belief in God (Funk and Smith 
2012). 
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3. Data and methods 
We estimate the size of the religiously affiliated and unaffiliated populations of each 
country as of 2010, as well as the age structure and fertility of each group, using the 
best available sources for each country. We rely on religious self-identity as measured 
in nationally representative censuses, surveys, and population registers. Recognizing 
that answers to religion measures may vary depending on question wording and 
context, we sought the most comparable and consistent measures of religious identity 
across countries (Hackett 2014). For 70 countries, data were available to measure recent 
patterns of religious switching using information about change between respondents’ 
childhood and adult religious affiliation. We model sex-specific patterns of switching 
from being affiliated to becoming unaffiliated, as well as switching from being 
unaffiliated to becoming affiliated.   
Using multistate demographic models, we project future populations based on 
differences in the age structure, fertility patterns, and religious switching of the 
affiliated and unaffiliated (Skirbekk, Kaufmann et al. 2010). The models assume that 
religious identity is passed from mother to child and that, as children enter their young 
adult years, they are susceptible to religious switching at rates observed among recent 
cohorts (in countries with available data).  
Here we report on scenarios with three different switching patterns. In the main 
switching rate scenario, recent rates of switching between affiliated and unaffiliated 
status are applied to new cohorts of young adults through the year 2050. As described 
below, the net impact of these rates is religious disaffiliation. In a second scenario we 
impose a 50% increase on recent rates of switching from affiliated status to unaffiliated 
status as well as on rates of retaining unaffiliated status, which further favors the 
unaffiliated. In a third scenario, recent rates of switching from unaffiliated status to 
affiliated status and rates of retaining affiliated status increase by 50%, which are more 
favorable toward the religiously affiliated. 
At the country level, fertility rates match the U.N.’s medium variant scenario 
throughout the projection period (United Nations 2011). Within countries, we model 
fertility variation for the affiliated and unaffiliated based on differential data gathered 
from censuses and surveys using direct and indirect fertility rate estimation methods. 
Our central projection retains initial fertility differences between unaffiliated and 
affiliated women in a country, while allowing for gradual convergence by 2110 (100 
years after the projections begin) based on the assumption that as education levels rise 
throughout the world, fertility differences will attenuate.  
Little research has been conducted on cross-national differences in mortality 
between the affiliated and the unaffiliated. Due to lack of available data, we assume the 
same mortality patterns within each country for the affiliated and the unaffiliated. Each 
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country’s projected mortality patterns are based on U.N. mortality tables for the 
country. At the global level, mortality rates for each group reflect differences between 
the countries in which the affiliated and unaffiliated are concentrated. Stable population 
theory suggests differential fertility between the affiliated and unaffiliated will be more 
consequential than potential differences in mortality. However, the studies currently 
available (Ellison and Hummer 2010) find that the communal religious activity of the 
affiliated has beneficial effects on mortality and morbidity. If this pattern obtains 
globally, we would expect a slight additional demographic advantage for the religiously 
affiliated.  
 
 
4. Demographic characteristics of the religiously unaffiliated 
Previous country-level studies have found that on average the unaffiliated begin having 
their children at an older age than the affiliated and have fewer children (Mosher, 
Williams et al. 1992, Skirbekk, Kaufmann et al. 2010). Using data aggregated from 
each country, we estimate that the global 2010−15 Total Fertility Rate (TFR) for 
unaffiliated women is 1.65 children per woman, nearly a full child less than the rate for 
religiously affiliated women of 2.59 children per woman.  
 
Figure 1: The religiously unaffiliated have fewer children, on average, than the 
affiliated 
Total Fertility Rates (children per woman) by region, 2010-2015 
 
Note: These fertility gaps between the unaffiliated and the affiliated reflect within-country differences as well as the concentration of  
   the unaffiliated in countries where both groups have relatively low fertility. 
   Insufficient data are available for reliably estimating unaffiliated fertility in the Middle East and North Africa. 
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The unaffiliated are considerably older, at the global level, than the affiliated, and 
thus more likely to be past their prime childbearing years. Among all women in 2010 
the global median age was 29, the median age for the unaffiliated population was 34, 
and the median age for the religiously affiliated was 28. In the Asia-Pacific region, 
where 76% of the unaffiliated lived in 2010, the median age of unaffiliated women was 
35, compared with 28 for the affiliated. However, the 2010 median age of unaffiliated 
women was lower than for the affiliated in Europe (38 vs. 43), Latin America (24 vs. 
29), and North America (30 vs. 40). Globally, people who identify with a religious 
group will benefit from population momentum as a large share of that population enters 
its childbearing years.  
While fertility and age patterns favor the affiliated, current religious switching 
patterns favor the unaffiliated. Over the four-decade projection period, 36 million 
people are expected to leave the ranks of the unaffiliated and 97 million are expected to 
switch into the unaffiliated category, a net gain of 61 million people for the unaffiliated. 
People who grew up as Christians are expected to make up the overwhelming majority 
of those who switch into the unaffiliated group. Additional details on the methods and 
data used to assess religious switching are available at http://www.pewforum.org/ 
2015/04/02/religious-projections-methodology/. 
 
 
5. Findings 
By 2050, the unaffiliated share of the world population is projected to decrease because 
the unaffiliated population has the twin demographic disadvantages of low fertility and 
an old age structure (Figure 2). Current demographic trends suggest that the religiously 
affiliated share of the world’s population will increase unless there is significant change 
in the fertility patterns of the unaffiliated or a major change in switching patterns. 
In our main scenario, the unaffiliated are projected to increase in absolute numbers 
by nearly 100 million people (9% growth between 2010 and 2050). However, the 
world’s overall population is expected to grow much faster (35% between 2010 and 
2050), adding 2.4 billion people during the 40-year period. Because that growth is 
driven disproportionately by births to affiliated women, the unaffiliated share of the 
world’s population is projected to decline from 16.4% in 2010 to 13.2% in 2050 
(Table 1). Even in the scenario with an additional 50% increase in switching patterns 
favoring the unaffiliated, the unaffiliated share of the world’s population would still 
decline to 14.3%. If switching patterns favoring the affiliated increase by 50%, the 
unaffliated share of the world would decline even further, to 12.2%.   
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Figure 2: The religiously unaffiliated are older, on average, than the affiliated 
   Age distribution, 2010 
 
Note: Men and women are included in each category. Figures may not add up to 100% because of rounding. 
 
Table 1: Projected change in unaffiliated share of global population,  
2010−2050 
Scenario Unaffiliated share of global population 
2010: Base population 16.4% 
2050: Current switching rates, which favor the 
unaffiliated, continue 
13.2% 
 
2050: Switching rates change 50% in favor of the 
unaffiliated 
14.3% 
 
2050: Switching rates change 50% in favor of the 
affiliated 
12.2% 
 
 
Note: These projection results are for 198 countries that made up 99.98% of the world’s population in 2010 
 
The expected trajectory of the religiously unaffiliated varies by region (Figure 3). 
In Europe and North America the religiously unaffiliated are young, relative to the rest 
of the population, and religious switching is adding to the size of this group. The 
number of unaffiliated people in Europe is projected to increase from 140 million in 
2010 to 162 million in 2050. In North America the unaffiliated are projected to increase 
from 59 million in 2010 to 111 million in 2050.  
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Figure 3: Projected change in religously unaffiliated and affiliated populations, 
2010−2050 
 
Note: These projection results are for 198 countries that made up 99.98% of the world’s population in 2010. 
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In the Asia-Pacific region, by contrast, the unaffiliated population is expected to 
decline from 858 million in 2010 to 838 million in 2050, due to its advanced age 
structure, low fertility, and absence of discernible increase through switching.  
These projections do not model any switching in China, where reliable information 
about switching patterns is unavailable. However, observers such as Fenggang Yang 
(2015) believe religious groups, including Christians, are growing in China because of 
switching. China is home to the majority of the world’s unaffiliated population (62% in 
2010), so if religious switching enlarges China’s affiliated population in coming 
decades this could lead to an even greater decline in the unaffiliated share of the 
world’s population. 
No other region’s total population is expected to grow more − or more rapidly − in 
coming decades than that of sub-Saharan Africa, where the 2010 population of 823 
million is projected to increase to 1.9 billion in 2050. The region’s unaffiliated 
population is expected to grow from 26 million in 2010 to 50 million in 2050, but will 
decrease slightly as a share of the regional population. 
The unaffiliated populations are projected to grow in number between 2010 and 
2050 in both Latin America (from 45 million to 65 million) and the Middle East-North 
Africa region (from 2 million to 3 million).  
 
 
6. Discussion 
Changes in religious identity can have important consequences for individuals and 
societies. For example, the affiliated and unaffiliated vary in patterns of family 
formation, educational attainment, civic engagement, and health outcomes (Zuckerman 
2009, Ellison and Hummer 2010, Funk and Smith 2012). They also vary in science 
knowledge and attitudes (Sherkat 2011). At the societal level, changes in the 
unaffiliated share of populations could influence political elections as well as how 
science and religion are taught in schools. 
Our projections show a growing divergence between highly affiliated, rapidly 
growing regions (sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East-North Africa) and 
increasingly unaffiliated regions with more modest population change (Europe and the 
Americas). The divergence in religious affiliation between these regions may make 
communication across cultures more difficult and heighten geopolitical tensions as the 
unaffiliated and affiliated struggle to understand one another’s worldview. 
These projections clarify how demographic advantages of the affiliated may lead 
to the group’s growth as a share of the world’s population. However, there are 
important limitations to this study (Hackett, Connor et al. 2015). It does not attempt to 
model how religious switching patterns may change in the future as countries 
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experience changes in education, urbanization, political governance, and economic 
development. The impact of economic development on religious identity is difficult to 
predict. Development may be accompanied by increasing rates of religious disaffiliation 
in countries that currently show little movement toward disaffiliation. However, it 
should not be taken for granted that all countries will follow a European pattern in 
which religious disaffiliation increases following advanced economic development. 
There is currently no precedent for this sequence in a Muslim-majority country. In 
Hindu-majority India, religious affiliation remains almost universal even as the country 
is experiencing major social changes. And while it is difficult to measure religion in 
China, religious identification seems to have increased as the country has developed 
economically. 
Another limitation of this study is that current patterns of religious switching are 
only available for 70 countries, which constitute 43% of the world’s population. The 
most consequential omissions are China and India. While there is no adequate data to 
directly measure individual change in religious identity in India, cohort-based analysis 
of Indian census and survey data does not provide evidence that switching per se is 
leading to net change in the size of religious groups. In China, the absence of switching 
data may lead to underestimates of global movement toward higher levels of religious 
affiliation. 
Additionally, these projections assume that current demographic trends and 
patterns of religious switching will continue. However, many developments could alter 
current patterns, including political and environmental crises or other shocks that might 
influence religious identity. Furthermore, this study does not model any switching 
activity in countries that lack data on current patterns of religious switching. 
Previous studies have only attempted to model religious switching for single 
country population projections. Future studies should continue to project how 
switching, along with standard demographic processes, may change the religious 
landscape of countries, regions, and the world. 
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